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1 Introduction
The eighteen papers in this special issue scrutinise the multifarious roles that identity
plays in mereology. In this introduction, we present an overview of the topics at stake.
Specically, in §2 we characterize in general the main points of contact between
mereology and the philosophical problems raised by identity. In §3 we deal with
the problem of whether mereology enjoys a status of topic neutrality and overall
logicality analogous to that usually attributed to identity. We also discuss the connected
epistemological problem of the alleged analyticity of some mereological principles. This
section presents the papers by Aaron Cotnoir, Jean-Baptiste Guillon, Paolo Maezioli
& Achille Varzi, Lorenzo Azzano and Meg Wallace. In §4 we focus on mereological
extensionality, discussing in particular the paper by Jeroen Smid. In §5 we ask whether
mereological principles can explain or ground other principles, or are in turn in need of
an explanation or ground, and we show that similar problems can arise about identity.
The papers by Joshua Spencer and Phillip Bricker are presented in this section. In §6
we compare the modal status of identity with the seemingly dierent modal status of
mereological relations, and we present in particular Manuel Lechthaler’s paper and
our own paper. In the last two sections (§§7, 8), we cover the papers that more directly
concern CAI. In §7 we show that some papers raise new issues for CAI and other related
philosophical theses. The contributions by Martin Lipman, Byeong-uk Yi and Claudio
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Calosi belong to this group. Finally, in §8, we introduce the new varieties of CAI and
some new reections on its methodological aspects, with a special focus on the papers
by Roberto Loss, Martina Botti, Jonathan Payton, Einar Bøhn and Evan Woods.
2 The Roles of Identity in Mereology
Mereology is the discipline that investigates the features of the relation of parthood (P ),
and of some other connected relations, such as proper parthood (PP ), overlap (◦) and
composition (Σ). Parthood is taken as a primitive relation. According to the standard
denitions of the other relations in terms of it, x is a proper part of y if and only if x is
a part of y and x is not identical to y; x overlaps y if and only if they have at least a
part in common; some xx (where xx , yy, zz, . . . are plural variables) compose a whole y
if and only if each of xx is part of y and every part of y overlaps with at least one of (≺)
xx :
x PP y ≡de f x P y ∧ x , y (Proper Parthood - Denition)
x ◦ y ≡de f ∃z(z P x ∧ z P y) (Overlap - Denition)
xx Σ y ≡de f ∀z(z ≺ xx → z P y) ∧ ∀z(z P y → ∃w(w ◦ z ∧w ≺ xx))
(Composition - Denition)
The features of these relations can be characterised by a theory, that is, by a set of
theorems, which follow from some axioms. A specic theory, namely Classical Exten-
sional Mereology (CEM), was dominant in the twentieth century, and several important
philosophers such as Goodman, Quine and Lewis believed that it characterised parthood
and the other cognate relations in a sound and exhaustive way. CEM can be derived
from three simple axioms, namely Transitivity of Parthood, Uniqueness of Composition
and Unrestricted Composition:
∀x∀y∀z(x P y ∧ y P z → x P z) (Transitivity of Parthood)
∀xx∀y(xx Σ y → ∀z(xx Σ z → z = y)) (Uniqueness of Composition)
∀xx∃y(xx Σ y) (Unrestricted Composition)
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Uniqueness of Composition and Unrestricted Composition jointly establish that for
every plurality of entities there is exactly one entity composed by these entities. CEM
includes as theorems several other principles of utmost philosophical interest, such as
Weak Supplementation, Strong Supplementation and Extensionality:
∀x∀y(x PP y → ∃z(¬z ◦ x ∧ z P y)) (Weak Supplementation)
∀x∀y(¬x P y → ∃z(z P x ∧ ¬z ◦ y)) (Strong Supplementation)
∀x∀y((∃z(z PP x) ∧ ∃z(z PP y)) → (∀z(z PP x ↔ z PP y) ↔ x = y)) (Extensionality)
Weak Supplementation dictates – roughly – that nothing has a single proper part.
Strong Supllementation establishes that, if x is not a part of y, then there is something
in y which does not overlap x . Extensionality sets forth identity conditions for every
entity having proper parts: they are identical if and only if they have the same proper
parts.
These controversial principles of CEM are mutually connected in a variety of ways.
Several alternative theories of parthood – non-classical mereologies – are currently
being explored. They are in most cases weaker than CEM, and drop some of its contro-
versial principles, often disentangling them one from another.
Extensionality is perhaps the most ambitious and controversial among the controver-
sial principles of CEM, inasmuch as it purports to provide identity conditions for the
large majority of entities in general (only entities without proper parts – i.e., atomic
entities – are out of its scope of application). Extensionality follows from the axiom
of the Uniqueness of Composition, and forbids any distinction of entities without an
underlying dierence in what is in them (i.e., their proper parts). As a consequence,
Extensionality is a powerful engine of ontological economy and was in consonance
with the nominalistic inclinations of the above mentioned original backers of CEM.
Non-classical mereologies are sometimes propelled by metaphysical stances (such
as dualism about constitution), which are incompatible with these austere forms of
ontological economy. Some non-classical mereologies are driven by the idea that
parthood and cognate relations should not be expected to work in the same way for
every category of entities: general metaphysical divides, such as the abstract/concrete
distinction and the artifactual/natural entities distinction, would also have an impact on
the features of the mereological relations that trespass these divides (see for Moltmann
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(1997) for a typical approach of this kind). According to some scholars, even less general
distinctions require a plurality of mereologies: for example, in the extreme case of
(Llored and Harré, 2014), even the mereology of chemistry should be pluralistic (i.e., the
various entities that chemistry is about require dierent mereologies).
Extensionality is about identity: it is the way in which CEM provides identity con-
ditions for every complex entity. Identity is also connected with composition. Owing
to Extensionality and the ensuing rejection of distinctions of entities without a dis-
tinction in their proper parts, it seems that (in a sense to be claried) any composed
entity is nothing more than its components. This led some philosophers, such as Lewis,
Armstrong and Baxter, to claim that composition is an identity relation. This thesis is
known as Composition as Identity (CAI).
CAI can be meant more or less strictly, and the degree of strictness depends on which
principles concerning identity are expected to also hold for composition. Identity is
classically seen as the smallest reexive relation on the universal domain, i.e., as the
relation which everything bears to itself and to nothing else. It is thought to be uniquely
identied by its Reexivity and by the Indiscernibility of Identicals:
∀x(x = x) (Reexivity of Identity)
∀x∀y(x = y → ∀P(Px ↔ Py)) (Indiscernibility of Identicals)
Both these principles about identity are accepted by a wide majority of philosophers.
Indeed, it is dicult to deny them. For what concerns Reexivity, it seems unclear how
anything could fail to be identical to itself. As regards Indiscernibility (which – as we are
going to see in the next sections – is slightly more controversial than Reexivity), the
hypothesis that identical entities have dierent properties seems dangerously similar
to a contradiction.
To what extent (if any) is it possible to extend these principle about identity to the
case of composition? Reexivity is not especially problematic, inasmuch as in CEM
everything indeed composes itself. The controversies mostly concern Indiscerniblity.
The claim that in every case of composition the components and the composed entity
share all their properties seems prima facie implausible. Donald Trump has some
properties, such as that of being human, which the molecules composing him prima
facie lack. Thus, it seems that in this case (as well as in many other similar cases) the
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components are not indiscernible from the composed entity. How can this appearance
be made compatible with CAI’s core claim that composition is an identity relation?
A goal of many defenders of CAI is to show that – in contrast with the above
prima facie analysis of Trump’s case – Indiscernibility can be extended to composition.
For example, they claim that, once the distinction between distributive and collective
predications is properly countenanced, the molecules are as collectively human as
Trump individually is. Other strategies for extending Indiscernibility to composition
are applied to trickier cases, such as those concerning cardinality: the appearance that
Trump is one and not many, while the molecules are many and not one would fade
away once cardinalities are relativised to concepts or ways of counting.
In general, it seems that CAI, due to the pivotal role which Indiscernibility plays in it,
ends up primarily concerning the features of components and composed entities. This
seems to make the subject matter of CAI dierent from the subject matter of mereology;
indeed, the axioms and theorems of CEM we have introduced above would not seem to
concern the features of parts and wholes at all. Other metaphysical disciplines, such as
the theories of supervenience and grounding, purport to characterise the links between
features of the parts and of the wholes, quite independently of mereological issues.
In turn, and despite the popularity of Reexivity and Indiscernibility of Identicals,
identity is the subject matter of complex and long-standing philosophical controversies,
which unavoidably interact with the mereological controversies about Extensionality
and CAI. The classical characterisation we have presented above assimilates identity to
logic, so that it is quite standard to consider rst-order logic with identity as a unitary
theory. As a consequence, also the theory of identity is expected to share with logic the
distinctive marks of logicality, that is, the kind of neutrality and generality which, for
those who are not radical logical pluralists at least, classical logic purportedly enjoys. In
particular, identity is expected to be formal and topic neutral, that is, to work precisely
in the same way no matter which kinds of entities it connects.
Moreover, the Indiscernibility of Identicals, together with the Necessary Reexivity of
Identity,1 entails that every instance of identity holds necessarily. While being a widely
accepted standard, this picture of identity has been and is contested by some alternative,
non-standard doctrines, which state that identity is relative (Geach, 1967, Deutsch
1Inasmuch as it is not clear how anything could fail to be identical with itself, Reexivity is thought to
hold also in the necessitated form: ∀x(x = x).
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and Garbacz, 2018), indeterminate (Parsons, 2000), modally contingent or temporally
occasional (Gibbard, 1975, Gallois, 1998). The backers of these alternatives often argue
that the Indiscernibility of Identicals should be restricted or rejected and/or that the
assimilation of identity to logic should be resisted.
Now, on the one hand, suppose that we accept Extensionality and perhaps even CAI,
thereby deeply entrenching identity in mereology. If we endorse the classical view of
identity, are we thereby entitled to extend the features of identity (or at least some
of them) to mereological relations? Is mereology a sort of logic (or is it a substantial
metaphysical doctrine)? Is mereology as formal and topic neutral as logic and identity
are? Do mereological relations always hold necessarily and permanently as classical
identity does? In contrast, if non-standard theories of identity are adopted, how do the
principles of CEM and CAI interact with them?
On the other hand, suppose that we incline towards non-classical mereologies, in
which Extensionality is dropped, for instance, or that mereological principles are ex-
pected to be specic to categories of entities. Does this cut every tie between mereology
and identity, or can non-classical mereologies be usefully compared with standard or
non-standard philosophical theses about identity?
3 Logicality, Topic Neutrality and Analyticity
According to the classical conception, identity is a paradigmatically formal, topic neutral
and logical notion. We have seen in §2 that this classical conception is contested by
many, but is nonetheless a sort of standard. Thus, if identity plays a pivotal role in
mereology, then the mereological principles could be expected to inherit from identity
the status of formality, or even of logicality, which the classical conception attributes to
it.
However, the concepts of formality, logicality and topic neutrality are in turn contro-
versial, and these controversies reverberate on the status of mereological principles. The
logical or non-logical, topic neutral or domain-specic status of mereological principles
also has a potential impact on their epistemic status. For example, both Reexivity
and Indiscernibility of Identicals are hardly doubtful and are implicit in the concept of
identity. How can anything be thought as failing to be identical to itself or as failing to
instantiate the features that it itself instantiates? Thus, these principles about identity
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could be analytic.
Then, if composition is an identity relation (as CAI claims), the principles about
composition (such as Uniqueness of Composition and Unrestricted Composition) could
also inherit a similar epistemic status, and thus be deemed analytic. The same might
hold true for the principles about parthood. Indeed, some principles about parthood,
such as Weak Supplementation, have often been considered analytic (see for example
Simons (1987, p. 116)).
The alleged analyticity of Weak Supplementation is discussed in Cotnoir’s paper,
Is Weak Supplementation Analytic? According to Cotnoir, many philosophers have
thought of Weak Supplementation as analytic because they assumed a specic view of
the relation of proper parthood. According to this view, a proper part of a certain whole
(in contrast to an improper part) would be intuitively something less than the whole.
Weak Supplementation would simply make the above intuition explicit, by claiming
that if x is a proper part of y, then y has something else in it (namely a part disjoint
from x ). This is the outstripping conception of proper parthood.
On the other hand, in recent years, some non-classical mereologies have been inves-
tigated, in which Weak Supplementation is not adopted (see for example Smith (2009)).
Despite their divergence from CEM, these theories seem to characterise in a certain
way the same relation of parthood that CEM characterises in another way. This means
that it is not plausible to think that a change of mereological theory leads to a change of
subject, analogously to what happens (according to Quine) when a change of logic leads
to a change of subject. If these mereological theories are genuinely about parthood,
then there is no reason to think that Weak Supplementation (which these mereologies
drop) is analytic with respect to parthood.
According to Cotnoir, these non-classical mereologies are crucially motivated by a
dierent conception of proper parthood, namely the non-identity conception, according
to which a proper part of a whole (in contrast to an improper part) is distinct from
the whole (i.e. is non-identical to it). In CEM, as we have seen above, proper parthood
is dened precisely in this way: x PP y ≡de f x P y ∧ x , y. Weak Supplementation
also holds in CEM: this means that in CEM both the outstripping conception and the
non-identity conception of proper parthood are adopted. However, in non-classical
mereologies, the two conceptions can be separated, which can be desirable in order
to account for some kinds of dualism about the metaphysics of material constitution.
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Given a statue and the co-located portion of clay, neither of them outstrips the other.
Nonetheless, according to dualists, the statue and the portion of clay are numerically
distinct because they have dierent features; for example, only the portion of clay (not
the statue) would continue to exist after the explosion of a powerful bomb, while only
the statue (not the portion of clay) has aesthetic properties, such as being in Romanic
style.
Which relation subsists between these two distinct entities? Given the non-identity
conception of proper parthood, this relation might be proper parthood, but this is
incompatible with the outstripping conception of proper parthood. Indeed, the statue
does not outstrip the portion of clay. Thus, to account for dualism, it seems desirable to
have a mereology that is faithful to the non-identity conception of proper parthood,
but not to the outstripping conception. This drives the adoption of a non-classical
mereology where Weak Supplementation (which is analytic only with respect to the
outstripping conception, not to the non-identity conception) is dropped.
Guillon’s Coincidence as Parthood makes even more explicit how some doubts about
Weak Supplementation can emerge from specic metaphysical problems. According
to Guillon, the rejection of Weak Supplementation is desirable because it paves the
way for an interesting and scarcely explored solution to the so-called Amputation
Paradox. Suppose that a person survives a radical surgical amputation, which removes
everything except the brain. Before the amputation, the person was not identical to her
brain. However, after the amputation, the person and the brain are spatially coincident,
and would seem to have the same parts. Are they identical? This would make identity
contingent, a solution that most philosophers are unwilling to swallow.
Guillon purports to develop a dualist approach to the person and to her brain, where
they are distinct both before and after the amputation. Both before and after the
amputation, the brain would be a proper part of the person. After the amputation, the
instance of proper parthood at stake violates Weak Supplementation: the person no
longer has any part disjoint from the brain. According to Guillon, there is no strong
reason to think that the brain ceases to be a proper part of the person just because the
other parts are removed. The reasons why the person and the brain are distinct (i.e.
having dierent properties and dierent histories before the amputation) continue to
hold true. Cotnoir’s non-identity conception of proper parthood is thus at work (even
if Guillon does not employ this terminology). It is at work even when the person does
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not outstrip the brain any more. The non-identity conception of proper parthood leads
Guillon to reject Weak Supplementation: after the amputation, the person has a single
proper part, namely her brain.
Guillon tentatively endorses a modalised version of Weak Supplementation, which
states “If x is a proper part of y, then possibly there is a z disjoint from x such that x
and z are both proper parts of y” (§5). In the above instance of the Amputation Paradox,
it is indeed possible for the person to have another proper part besides the brain (this
possibility was actualised before the amputation), and this possibility is a ground for
distinguishing the person from the brain (indeed, the brain has no analogous possibility).
Guillon’s modalised version of Weak Supplementation is a new candidate for the role
of analytic mereological principle, and certainly deserves further scrutiny.
In contrast, Maezioli and Varzi’s Intuitionistic Mereology discusses a kind of conti-
nuity between mereology and logic. Their paper concerns the problem of the impact
of a change in the underlying logic on mereology. In particular, they show that the
impact of replacing classical logic with intuitionistic logic concerns Extensionality,
and – as a consequence – the identity conditions for complex entities. In general, the
authors show a certain degree of porosity between logic and mereology: if we weaken
the underlying logic, we are forced to strengthen the proper axioms of mereology in
order to regain an extensional theory. This kind of porosity might hint at the claim
that mereology and logic share a similar status, from the perspective of logicality and
perhaps also of analyticity. The same reasons that might lead us to doubt the analyticity
of mereological principles (as in Cotnoir’s paper) might lead us to doubt the analyticity
of the underlying logical principles, given that the results that might be obtained by
weakening mereological principles might also be gained by weakening the principles of
the underlying logic. Some passing remarks about the continuity between mereology
and logic can also be found in Bricker’s Composition as Identity, Leibniz’s Law, and Slice-
Sensitive Emergent Properties (which we consider more extensively in §5). In continuity
with a stance on the logicality of mereology which is often attributed to Lewis, Bricker
explicitly states, “I take mereology to be a part of logic, broadly construed” (§8). Bricker
seems to incline towards the idea that mereology, on a par with logic, is a neutral tool
for metaphysical disputes.
Azzano’s paper, Structural Properties, Mereology and Modal Magic, expresses a radi-
cally dierent stance on the logicality and the topic neutrality of mereology. Azzano
9
explicitly opposes the idea that mereology is topic neutral as logic is often expected
to be; indeed, he proposes that the adoption or the rejection of some mereological
principles primarily depends on some specic features of the metaphysics of properties.
According to Azzano, if structural properties (such as the property of being a methane
molecule) are universals, then mereology should not be extensional; however, he con-
cedes that this outcome might be avoided if structural properties are construed as tropes.
As a consequence, the adoption of a principle (Extensionality), which is a theorem of
CEM, is shown to depend on whether properties are at stake, and on whether these
properties are universals or tropes. Thus, if Azzano is right, the category or the nature
of the entities that are the relata of parthood and composition has a pivotal bearing on
the choice of mereological principles.
Wallace’s The Polysemy of ‘Part’ discusses some linguistic evidence that could be
of interest for the opponents of the topic neutrality of mereology. Moreover, this
evidence could support a form of mereological pluralism (the most inuential defenses
of mereological pluralism being Fine (2010) and McDaniel (2014)), in which dierent
theories of parthood are needed for dierent categories of entities. Many introductions
to mereology (e.g. Casati and Varzi (1999, ch. 2) and Lando (2017, ch. 1)) begin by
analysing excerpts of natural language about parthood. These introductions do not
claim or presuppose that mereology should account for every true sentence about
parthood in every human language. For example, it is usually conceded that a highly
metaphorical love declaration such as “I am part of you, you are part of me, but we
are dierent persons” should not be taken too seriously as a counterexample to the
antisymmetry of parthood. The more modest expectation is that natural language is
helpful in delimiting the subject matter of mereology, i.e in identifying the relations
mereology is about.
Wallace’s analysis of "part" and related terms in English suggests that if natural
language is a reliable guide in delimiting the subject matter of mereology, then mereol-
ogy is about several relations of parthood, thereby legitimising mereological pluralism.
To show that “part” in English is a polysemous term, Wallace resorts to the so-called
zeugma test: there is a zeugma when something odd or funny is perceived by a com-
petent hearer in front of a single occurrence of a polysemous word. According to
Wallace, the following parthood-related claim would be zeugmatically odd: “The soul
is composed of three parts, and so is this puzzle”. The zeugma would be the outcome of
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the polysemy of "parts".
Perhaps, the oddness of this specic claim might be explained simply by the fact that
it is odd to speak about puzzles and souls in a single sentence. Suppose that someone
says (without any part-related lexicon) “I enjoy solving puzzles, and my husband’s
soul is dirty”. Her claim sounds odd; however, the oddness is not the upshot of any
zeugma or polysemy, but of a lack of cohesion between the two subject matters of
her claim. The source of the oddness of the sentence “I enjoy solving puzzles, and my
husband’s soul is dirty” might also be the source of the oddness of “the soul is composed
of three parts, and so is this puzzle”; and no further explanation would then be needed.
Nonetheless, in her paper, Wallace discusses several other cases in which “part” seems
to be a polysemous term. In particular, these cases display a heterogeneity between the
applications of “part” to concrete entities and its applications to abstract ones. These
cases will likely further stimulate the investigation of the topic neutrality of mereology
and the debate between mereological monism and mereological pluralism.
4 Extensionality
As we have anticipated in §2, Extensionality is a central, philosophically controversial
principle of CEM. It is connected with the general, broadly nominalistic expectation
that there is “no distinction of entities without distinction of content” (Goodman, 1956,
p. 202), and this expectation has been a primary motivation for the adoption of CEM
as the true and exhaustive theory of parthood (see Lando (2017, ch. 5) for an analysis
of the nominalistic motivations of mereology). However, this is simply mereological
Extensionality. Other forms of extensionality principles are discussed in other contexts,
prima facie quite independently of mereology. In particular, there are principles of
extensionality for sets or pluralities, which claim that two sets or two pluralities are
identical if and only if they have the same elements or members.
Some well-known connections exist among the various principles of extensionality.
In general, these principles forbid distinctions among entities without a concomitant
dierence about what is in them, where the nature of this being in changes from case
to case (being in consists in parthood for mereological wholes, elementhood for sets
and being one of for pluralities). The extensionality for sets also performs a key role
in Lewis’s project of reducing the set theory to mereology (Lewis, 1991); if sets were
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allowed to be dierent despite having the same elements (in contrast to set-theoretic
extensionality), then Lewis’s idea about sets as mereological sums of the singletons of
their elements would be a non-starter. In turn, extensionality for sets and extensionality
for pluralities are also strictly connected to each other, inasmuch as two pluralities xx
and yy are identical if and only if the sets {xx} and {yy} are identical as well.
In his paper, Extensionality for Fusions and Pluralities, Smid shows that mereolog-
ical Extensionality and extensionality for pluralities also have an interesting, direct
connection. The connection particularly concerns the arguments against these two
principles of extensionality: the usual arguments against mereological Extensionality
are structurally similar to bad, unconvincing arguments against extensionality for
pluralities. As a consequence, it is also possible to export to the mereological case the
reasons why the bad arguments against extensionality for pluralities are indeed bad,
thereby obtaining a defence of mereological Extensionality from the usual arguments.
Consider the well-known case of the Tinkertoy house; in contrast with the fusion of
the Tinkertoys in it, the house would survive if one of the Tinkertoys were replaced.
Dualists about constitution argue from this that the Tinkertoy house and the fusion
of the Tinkertoys are discernible one from another and, owing to the Indiscernibility
of Identicals, are also numerically distinct (Thomson, 1983). Analogously, the Pink
Floyd continued to exist even when Barrett had been replaced by Gilmour. However,
Smid argues that this would be a poor reason to think that the members of Pink Floyd
are not plurally identical to Barrett, Mason, Wright and Waters. The fact that at a
certain point in time the denotation of the description “the members of Pink Floyd”
changes does not show that there is any dierence in the modal prole of what “the
members of Pink Floyd” and “Barrett, Mason, Wright and Waters” denoted in 1969
(before the replacement of Barrett); they denoted a single plurality that always and
necessarily is identical to itself. This legitimises us to react in the same way to the
analogous Tinkertoy-like arguments against mereological Extensionality. In particular,
we should be sceptical about arguments that proceed from linguistically based forms of
discernibility to claims of numerical distinctness.
In a short passage in his paper (§7), Smid also tentatively points to an innovative way
of dealing with anti-extensionalist intuitions about the Tinkertoy house and similar
cases from the theory of material constitution, while retaining both mereological
Extensionality and extensionality for pluralities. Dualists about constitution usually
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want to distinguish the structured house from the mere fusion or collection of the
Tinkertoys, inasmuch as they would be discernible. However, the motivations for this
distinction might be more straightforwardly served by the distinction between a single
whole (the Tinkertoy house) on the one hand, and the plurality of Tinkertoys on the
other. The Tinkertoy house abides by mereological Extensionality, while the plurality
of Tinkertoys abides by extensionality for pluralities; what dualists deem to be the mere
fusion or collection would actually be an extensional plurality of entities, while the
Tinkertoy house would be the real, extensional mereological whole.
Extensionality plays a pivotal role in several other papers in the S.I., some of which
have already been discussed here. For example, Azzano’s Structural Properties, Mereol-
ogy, and Modal Magic scrutinises the failure of Extensionality for universal structural
properties, and Maezioli and Varzi’s Intuitionistic Mereology shows that Extensionality
requires a stronger foundation, if the logical core of mereology is an intuitionistic one.
5 Explanation
The nominalistic motivations of mereological Extensionality can also be perceived as a
request for a metaphysical explanation or ground for numerical distinctness; according
to Extensionality, in the case of complex entities, the only admissible ground consists of
their proper parts. No purely qualitative ground for numerical distinctness is admissible.
An ideological anomaly of this approach relates to the fact that mereological atoms end
up being treated in a special way. Since they have no proper part, their distinctness
cannot be explained by their proper parts; thus, the explanation has to be dierent, and
presumably qualitative. However, if qualitatively-grounded distinctness is admissible
for mereological atoms, why should it be inadmissible for complex entities? Goodman’s
maxim “no distinction of entities without distinction of content” loses some of its appeal
owing to its admitting exceptions.
However, numerical distinctness is strictly connected with its opposite – numerical
identity. There are good reasons to doubt that the single instances of identity need to
be explained at all. Each single instance of identity connects an entity with itself. Each
of these instances might be explained by the fact that identity – as we have seen in
§2 – is in general reexive, and this might in turn depend on the nature of identity
itself; no explanation or ground specic to a certain self-identical entity is needed. If the
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single instances of identity need no explanation, then perhaps the single instances of
distinctness (i.e. of non-identity) also do not need any explanation, and the problem
of whether the explanation has to be exclusively mereological or not becomes moot
(Fine (2016) and Carrara and De Florio (2018) are two recent works on grounding and
identity criteria).
The general problem of whether single instances of relations need an explanation also
emerges in mereology. Many classical theories about mereology have been formulated
(e.g. by Goodman, van Inwagen and Lewis) when explanation, grounding and other
hyperintensional relations were not yet at center stage; in contrast, these relations
are now of primary concern for contemporary metaphysics (see Nolan (2014) for an
overview).
Spencer deals with an instance of this general issue in his paper, On the Explanatory
Demands of the Special Composition Question. He focuses on van Inwagen’s Special
Composition Question (SCQ) and on the expectation that a satisfying answer to it (i.e.
a restriction of composition) should be explicative. Given an instance of composition in
which some entities tt compose an entity u, Spencer distinguishes between two prima
facie plausible explananda for SCQ: a compositional fact (i.e., the fact that tt compose u)
and an ontological fact (i.e., the fact that u – the composed entity – exists). SCQ might
thus be given either a wide or a narrow explanatory scope. The explanatory scope is
narrow if only the compositional fact is explained; the explanatory scope is wide if both
the compositional fact and the ontological fact are explained. The distinction between
an ontological fact and a compositional fact is typically hyperintensional, inasmuch as
there is no possible scenario where one of them subsists and the other fails to subsist
(indeed, tt compose u if and only if u exists).
The answers to SCQ (including Unrestricted Composition) claim that, at certain more
or less trivial conditions, there is something composed of certain entities. Thus, any
instance of an answer to SCQ is an existentially quantied claim about the composed
entity, and expresses an ontological fact, in Spencer’s terminology. However, based
on the recent literature on grounding, Spencer observes that an existential quantied
claim is already grounded by the entity/entities in the domain of quantication that
satises/satisfy the quantied formula. As a consequence, the additional ground –
which SCQ should provide if its explanatory scope is wide – would be redundant, and
would risk generating an unacceptable form of overdetermination. For Spencer, this
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provides a reason to conclude that an answer to SCQ should be expected to ground
only compositional facts and not ontological facts too.
There is also a more general sense in which explanation can be important for mereol-
ogy. It is not always clear what mereology, as a philosophical discipline, is expected to
explain: there are tendencies to push the explanatory duties of mereology well beyond
the formal characterisation of parthood and cognate relations. Bricker’s Composition as
Identity, Leibniz’s Law, and Slice-Sensitive Emergent Properties shows that these tenden-
cies are rooted in CAI; indeed, as we have seen in §2, the claim that composition is an
identity relation, via the Indiscernibility of Identicals, ends up greatly expanding the
expected explanatory duties of mereology.
Let us see how. According to Bricker, the viability of CAI depends on whether it is
possible to identify a principled restriction of the indiscernibility principle that holds
for composition. Indeed, if composition did not respect a decently inclusive and well-
motivated indiscernibility principle, then it would not qualify as a genuine identity
relation. Bricker explores the prospects of an indiscernibility principle restricted to
properties ascribing a qualitative character. He shows that to circumscribe the domain
of these properties it is pivotal to hold the view that, at the level of being, portions of
reality are not characterised as being either singular or plural. The properties to which
the indiscernibility principle is restricted should never depend on whether a certain
portion of reality is described as either singular or plural.
Even when the neutrality of portions of reality with respect to the singular/plural
distinction is conceded, the viability of CAI depends on whether there are slice-sensitive,
qualitative emergent properties, that is, qualitative properties that are instantiated by a
portion of reality sliced in a certain way and are not instantiated by that same portion of
reality sliced in another way. For example, consider a world composed by some atoms,
in a certain order. a1 has a positive charge, a2 has a negative charge, a3 has a positive
charge, a4 has a negative charge, and so on. Now consider the net charge of this entire
world; it possibly depends on how the atoms are sliced in pluralities. If they are sliced in
couples such as < a1,a2 >, < a3,a4 > . . ., then the net charge will depend on something
like (1 - 1) + (1 - 1) + . . . , and it will then be 0. In contrast, if they are sliced in an initial
single-membered plurality and then in couples (< a1 >, < a2,a3 >, < a4,a5 > . . .),
then the net charge will depend on 1 + (-1 + 1) + (-1 + 1) + . . . , and it will then be 1. The
net charge of such a world is a slice-sensitive emergent property, because it does not
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only depend on the properties of the parts, but also on how these parts are sliced in
pluralities. If these kinds of properties exist, then the restriction to qualitative properties
does not deliver an indiscernibility principle for composition, and the tenability of CAI
is at risk. Thus, the tenability of CAI ends up depending on problems that go well
beyond a narrow understanding of the explanatory duties of mereology and do not
concern mereological relations at all.
6 Modality
Consider the following scenario. Yesterday at 9 p.m., the extremity e of a man’s left
pinky toe nail was part of his body b. The fusion of e and of the other parts of his
body was b. At 9.01 p.m. he cut e with nail clippers. As a consequence, e stopped
being part of b, and the fusion of e with the remaining part of his body started being
a scattered object, located partly on his couch and partly in his trash can. Parthood
relations and composition relations seem to change in time, and to be also modally
contingent; the man’s shirt s has a certain button b1 as a part, but another button b2
could have been used in the production process; it is seemingly contingent that b1 is
part of s and compose s together with the other parts of s , and it is equally contingent
that b2 is not part of s .
These claims about the occasionality and the contingency of parthood and composi-
tion depends on broad philosophical options in the philosophy of time and modality.
If a kind of perdurantism about persistence is adopted, one might deny that there is
inter-temporal identity, and therefore also deny that a single entity (b) includes e at
a certain time and does not include e at a later time. Thus, the option of denying the
occasionality of mereological relations becomes viable. Analogously, if a theory of
modal parts is adopted such that the shirt s includes as parts all its counterparts in
other possible worlds, as well as all the parts of these counterparts (and thus also a
counterpart of the button b2), then the option of denying the contingency of parthood
and composition also begins looking less repugnant.
In any case, if identity plays a pivotal role in mereology, the problem of comparing
the modal status of identity with the modal status of mereological relations emerges.
Given Extensionality, the identity conditions for any complex entity exclusively depend
on their proper parts. Thus, we may expect the instances of identity among complex
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entities to have the same modal and temporal status of the instances of proper parthood.
Moreover, if composition is really an identity relation (as the backers of CAI claim),
then composition and identity can be expected to be equally necessary (or equally
contingent), and equally permanent (or equally occasional).
Barcan and Kripke’s powerful argument, based on the Necessary Reexivity of
Identity and of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, proves that any instance of identity
holds necessarily. Every x has indeed the property of being necessarily identical to
itself, that is, to x . Every y that is identical to x has – owing to the Indiscernibility of
Identicals – this same feature. Thus, every y that is identical to x is necessarily identical
to x .
Analogously, the permanence of identity can also be proven. Given the links between
mereology and identity, there is an ensuing risk of making all the instances of parthood
and composition equally necessary and permanent. In the extant literature this line
of thought has been used as either a refutation of CAI (composition is contingent and
identity is necessary; thus, composition is not an identity relation, contra CAI; Merricks
(1999)); or as a reason to integrate CAI with a specic theory of modality, such as the
counterpart theory or the theory of modal parts (Bøhn, 2014, Wallace, 2014). However,
the problem of the modal and temporal mismatch between identity and mereological
relations is only seldom discussed in the literature about mereology and identity and
surely deserves further scrutiny.
In our paper, Contingent Composition as Identity, we suggest a new variety of CAI that
preserves both the contingency of composition and the necessity of standard identity,
by anking standard identity with a non-standard variety of identity, which is relative
to possible worlds. In the variety of CAI that we outline, composition is an identity
relation of the latter, world-relative variety. We show that the ensuing characterisation
of the world-relative variety of identity is interestingly similar to some well-known
doctrines of contingent and occasional identity.2
The modal and temporal mismatch between identity and mereological relations is
also discussed in several other papers. In his paper, No Universalism Without Gunk?
Composition as Identity and the Universality of Identity, Lechthaler discusses the modal
status of the Universality of Identity, which states that for any entity, something is iden-
tical to it. This principle is so basic and implicit in the tight connection between identity
2The similarity is especially tight with respect to the doctrine of occasional identity of Gallois (1998).
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and quantication that it could not admit exceptions in any counterfactual scenario;
thus, it is a necessary principle. Lechthaler shows that the Necessary Universality of
Identity leads to hardly digestible consequences when it is applied to CAI, and to the
peculiar one-many instances of identity that would connect any whole with its parts.
The outcome would be that necessarily any entity is identical to many entities. Thus,
necessarily everything has proper parts. The scenario in which everything has proper
parts is usually called “gunk” (Lewis, 1991, pp. 20-21). Reality would be necessarily
gunky, while the existence of mereological atoms would be impossible. This outcome is
especially troubling, because whether the world is atomic or gunky (a fact that is not
settled by any theorem of CEM) is usually expected to be a contingent matter, to be
assessed a posteriori and on the basis of scientic evidence.
Azzano’s Structural Properties, Mereology, and Modal Logic (which we have already
discussed in §3) also countenances (and nally rejects) the idea that if a structural
property is the mereological fusion of some simpler properties and CAI is adopted,
then we obtain an explanation of the necessary link between the instantiation of the
structural property by a whole and the instantiation of the simpler properties by its
parts. For example, we would thus explain why the fact that a certain whole is a water
molecule is necessarily coordinated with the fact that one of its parts is an oxygen atom.
The explanation would be that the property of being a molecule of water is composed
of simpler properties, such as being an oxygen atom and being a hydrogen atom, and –
modulo CAI and the Necessity of Identity – is also necessarily identical to these simpler
properties.3
7 Composition as Identity: New Problems
There are many objections against CAI in the literature. Some of them have already been
satisfactorily addressed by the defenders of CAI. For example, van Inwagen’s syntactic
objection to CAI (van Inwagen, 1994), according to which a many-one identity claim
about some entities to be fused and their fusion is syntactically ill-formed, is hardly
relevant in the contemporary debate. As Cotnoir (2013, §1.2) has shown, even English
has the resources to express many-one identities, through singularisation devices that
3This proposal, which Azzano rejects, has been defended in Hawley (2010).
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build syntactically singular referential expressions out of semantically plural ones.
These devices are the so-called free relatives, such as “what” in:
What the entities to be fused are identical to is their fusion.
The fusion of the entities to be fused is what they are identical to.
Moreover, some prima facie worrisome discernibility-based objections (i.e., objections
that are based on the fact that a whole is discernible from its parts and thus cannot be
identical to them, given the Indiscernibility of Identicals) can be deated, once – as we
have seen in §2 – the distinction between distributive and collective predications is
considered. For example, the mere remark that a person’s body is visible while the cells
composing it are not visible is not a decisive objection against the identity of the body
with the molecules: the molecules are not invisible distributively, but they collectively
are as visible as the body is (see in particular Wallace (2011b)).
In contrast, other problems for CAI (including some discernibility-based objections,
as we shall show) are still far from being satisfactorily solved. Some papers in the S.I.
deepen the analysis of these persisting problems, or introduce new objections to CAI.
Lipman’s On Relativist Approaches to Many-One Identity focuses on the challenge of
numerical discernibility, which states that the parts cannot be identical to the whole
because the parts are many, while the whole is one. Some defenders of CAI (see in
particular Bøhn (2014) and the paper by Bøhn in this S.I)4 address the problem of
numerical discernibility by endorsing the broadly Fregean contention that cardinality
attributions should be relativised to concepts. Thus, the Benelux, which is composed
by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, would be identical to them; both the
Benelux and Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg would be one relative to the
concept of a multi-national entity and would be three relative to the concept of a
country. These relativisation strategies are usually preferred to a primitivist strategy,
according to which the compatibility of dierent cardinality ascriptions is a primitive,
unexplained fact (see Spencer (2017)).
Lipman shows that, at the end of the day, the relativisation strategies fail to explain
how identical entities can be both one thing and many things, and from this viewpoint,
such strategies have no advantage over the primitivist alternative. Indeed, when two
4See Carrara and Lando (2017) for a general analysis of the relativisation strategies.
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cardinalities are relativised to two concepts, the problem of why the portion of matter
at stake can be conceptualised according to those two concepts, and not according
to other concepts, arises. For example, the supporters of the Fregean relativisations
explain the fact that a deck of cards is both 1 and 52 by relativizing these cardinalities
to the concepts deck of card and card respectively. However, this raises the problem
of explaining why these two concepts are suitable for conceptualising that portion
of matter, while the concept frog, for example, is unsuitable, as well as the problem
of explaining why the concept card delivers precisely the cardinality 52, whereas the
concept deck of cards delivers by contrast the cardinality 1. Lipman argues that this
is no less puzzling than the primitivist naked claim that the same portion of matter is
both 1 and 52.
It might be asked whether the extant relativisation strategies really aspire to explain
the compatibility of dierent cardinalities, and are therefore directly damaged by
Lipman’s analysis. Perhaps they simply assume that there are uncontroversial and
independently motivated examples of single entities that are counted relatively to
dierent concepts. For example, we commonly count the deck of cards in two ways,
by specifying sortals or concepts (such as deck of cards and card); the two ways of
counting deliver dierent cardinalities, 1 and 52. Once we admit that this happens in
some cases, we have a precedent that legitimises us to dispose of the seeming numerical
discernibility of the whole and its parts. Lipman rightly states that the relativisers do
not explain why certain concepts are suitable or unsuitable or why they deliver certain
cardinalities. Arguably, this is not their duty qua defenders of CAI.
In his Is Composition Identity? Yi focuses on the dicult interaction between CAI
and plural logic, that is, the logic concerning inferences among sentences that include
plural quantied variables such as xx and constants such as tt . As we have already
seen when formalizing some mereological principles above, plural logic is very useful
in mereology. The most worrying (for CAI) upshot of the interaction between CAI and
plural logic is the so-called Collapse problem (Collapse henceforth; see Sider (2007),
Yi (1999) and Calosi (2018)). Collapse consists of the following: CAI, together with
some seemingly uncontroversial assumptions, would entail that, given some entities
tt that compose an entity u, all and only the entities that are parts of u are one of tt .
The right-to-left direction of Collapse (where every entity that is one of tt is part of u)
follows from the denition of mereological composition (see (Composition - denition)
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in §2). The left-to-right direction (where every entity that is part of u is one of tt ) is
the real cause of scandal, and can be proven as follows. Consider v , a part of u. The
seemingly uncontroversial principle of Plural Covering states that, if an entity x is part
of an entity y, then there is a plurality of entities zz such that x is one of zz and y is the
fusion of zz. Let ww be such a plurality in the case of v and u: v is one of ww and u is
the fusion of ww . Given CAI, u is identical both to both tt and ww (inasmuch as it is
both the fusion of tt and the fusion of ww). Thus, by transitivity of identity, tt and ww
are also mutually identical. By the Indiscernibility of Identicals, whatever is one of ww
is also one of tt : v is one of ww , and thus v is also one of tt .
The mutual collapse of parthood and being one of is dicult to digest for most
common-sense instances of mereological wholes, which are decomposable in multiple
ways, and as a result, have much more parts than the members of the single plurality
of entities that they fuse. There are interesting attempts (see Sider (2014) and the paper
by Loss in this S.I., which we discuss in §8 below) to block the reasoning by rejecting
the principle of Plural Covering, which in turn (claiming that, given any instance of
parthood, there is a certain plurality of parts) depends on the Comprehension Principle
of the underlying plural logic. A typical formulation of the Comprehension Principle
states that, if something satises a certain open formula, then there exists a plurality of
entities that satisfy it. However, the Comprehension Principle lies at the core of plural
logic, and it is methodologically controversial to curtail it in order to prevent CAI from
entailing an undesirable consequence.
Arguably, plural logic serves many other purposes that are independent of CAI and
in general of mereology. It can be used as an interpretation of second-order logic or as a
tool to express principles of set-existence (see for example Linnebo (2018, chs. 1, 12)). A
weakened Comprehension Principle risks being inadequate for these non-mereological
purposes of plural logic.
Furthermore, if we prescind from other applications of plural logic and we only focus
on mereology, plural logic might be expected to be a neutral tool by which CAI and,
in general, mereological principles can be formulated and assessed, and this makes
it inadvisable to change plural logic in order to avoid Collapse and defend CAI. Yi
defends and develops this methodological approach. Yi shows that CAI leads to various
problems, all connected with the above mentioned Collapse. As already shown by
Calosi (2016), in particular, CAI leads to the claim that nothing has proper parts, so that
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the only cases of composition are those where the single, improper part of anything
composes itself. CAI becomes the trivial, undisputed and uninteresting thesis that
improper parthood is a genuine identity relation. As Yi underlines, no genuine advocate
of CAI would be satised with such trivialisation; CAI is primarily intended by its
advocates to hold for non-trivial cases of composition, in which some proper parts of
something jointly compose it.
Yi also argues that if CAI is conjoined with Unrestricted Composition (the axiom of
CEM that states that every plurality of entities has a fusion), then a form of monism
follows: indeed, Mereological Universalism warrants that the mereological universe
(i.e. an entity that is the fusion of everything) exists. However, in its above-mentioned
trivialised form, CAI leads to the claim that nothing has proper parts; as a consequence,
the universe also has only improper parts, that is, only parts that are identical to it.
Thus, everything is identical to the universe, which ends up being the only existing
entity (here is the ensuing monism).
This consequence may seem disastrous. However, it is important to remember that
monism follows only if CAI and Mereological Universalism are combined with the
perfectly standard form of plural logic adopted by Yi; and that this combination will
likely not be in the agenda of genuine backers of CAI, given that (as we have shown)
many other, already well-known problematic consequences (e.g. Collapse itself) follow
from the combination of CAI with standard plural logic.
Calosi’s objections in his Is Parthood Identity? do not concern CAI directly, but
the cognate thesis of Parthood as Identity, set forth by McDaniel (2014). In his paper
McDaniel intended to explain several mereological principles (e.g. the Reexivity of
Parthood, the Transitivity of Parthood and Extensionality) directly in terms of the fact
that parthood is an identity relation. Calosi shows that McDaniel’s doctrine of Parthood
as Identity encounters several diculties, particularly regarding the interface between
mereology and the theory of spatial location. McDaniel assumes a form of endurantism,
where enduring entities instantiate properties in the spatio-temporal regions that they
occupy. Relations are instantiated at the union of the space-time regions that the relata
occupy. The relation of parthood – in particular – would be instantiated at the region
occupied by the whole, inasmuch as the region occupied by the part is a sub-region of
the region occupied by the whole, and as a consequence, the union of the two regions
is simply the region occupied by the whole.
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Identity is also instantiated relative to space-time regions. Indeed, McDaniel denes
parthood in terms of this kind of relativised identity, as follows. x is part of y if and
only if:
a) x is identical to y at the region occupied by y;
b) x is not identical to y at the smaller region occupied by x .
As it happens in other doctrines of relative identity, McDaniel’s approach to identity
is forced to limit the Indiscernibility of Identicals. In particular, McDaniel limits it to
region-free properties (i.e. properties that do not encode any information about regions
of space). Calosi shows that, in the light of the current literature about spatio-temporal
location, McDaniel’s occupation is better understood as exact location. The following
problem ensues: suppose that x is a part of y at the region r , which is the region at
which y is exactly located. Given McDaniel’s denition of parthood in terms of identity,
this entails that x is identical to y at region r , where y is exactly located. Given the
restricted form of indiscernibility, x also shares with y at r all the region-free properties.
This means that x instantiates all these properties at r . But this entails that x is exactly
located at r , so that the part and the whole end up being exactly located at the same
region. This seems unacceptable, since any intuitively “smaller” proper part of a whole
is not exactly located at the same spatio-temporal region at which the whole is located.
Moreover, Calosi suggests (and proves in the case of the Transitivity of Parthood)
that, in McDaniel’s proposal, the formal features of parthood are not really explained by
the doctrine of Parthood as Identity, but by the formal features of the relation of spatial
sub-region, where this relation is in turn modelled on set-theoretic inclusion. Given the
well-known formal similarities between parthood and set-theoretic inclusion (those
similarities that have led Lewis (1991) to hold the view that set-theoretic inclusion is
indeed a case of parthood), this reduction is unsurprising. As a consequence, Parthood
as Identity risks lacking its expected explanatory value.
8 Composition as Identity: New Perspectives
In the extant literature, CAI already comes in a variety of versions, which are sometimes
distinguished according to their strength: for example, Weak CAI would merely claim
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that composition is analogous to identity, while stronger versions would claim that
literally composition is identity (see Sider (2007), Wallace (2011a) and Cotnoir (2014)
for a taxonomy of the various extant versions of CAI). This variety notwithstanding,
all the extant versions agree on the following claims:
i) All the instances of composition, regardless of the size of the involved entities,
are covered by CAI and are consequently assimilated to identity; CAI is thus
expected to be absolutely general.
ii) The underlying metaontology is Quinean, so that – in particular – the quantiers
employed in the claim that every plurality of entities to be fused and every
fusion are such that the fused entities are identical to the fusion are absolutely
unrestricted, and commit us to their existence.
iii) CAI needs to address an issue of numerical discernibility (discussed above in
§7) because the parts are numerically many and the whole is numerically one;
in particular, the unity of the whole, which determines this issue, is a matter of
cardinality.
We now show that three authors of the S.I. – namely Loss, Botti, Payton – have
developed a new variety of CAI by abandoning i), ii) and iii) respectively.
Loss’s On Atomic Composition as Identity presents a variety of CAI in which i) is
dropped, inasmuch as CAI would only hold for the relation between any whole and
its atomic parts. The main reason for this restriction to atomic parts is connected with
Collapse. According to Sider (2014), Collapse shows that there are “fewer pluralities
than are normally expected” (p. 213). As we have shown with regard to Yi’s paper, as
discussed in §7, this approach is methodologically problematic, inasmuch as it ends up
weakening plural logic in order to salvage CAI (a controversial thesis, rejected by most
philosophers). Loss takes Sider’s suggestion seriously, and advocates a version of the
Comprehension Principle according to which there are only pluralities of mereological
atoms, i.e. of entities without any proper part. Loss’s weakening of the Comprehension
Principle hits one of the philosophical roots of Collapse, and extirpates it. The root at
stake relates to the fact that, if a whole can be divided into two pluralities of parts (in
Loss’s example, a house is both composed by a plurality of bricks and by a plurality
of mereological atoms), then – by CAI and by the Transitivity of Identity – the two
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pluralities are mutually identical although their members are distinct (presumably, no
mereological atom is a brick and no brick is a mereological atom). Given Loss’s version
of the Comprehension Principle, this undesirable outcome is avoided, because there are
only pluralities of atoms.
Loss’s restriction of CAI to the relation between a whole and its atomic parts is in
consonance with one of the primary nominalistic motivations at the basis of CEM,
namely Goodman’s above quoted dictum “no distinction of entities without a distinction
of content”. For Goodman the content consisted precisely of the ultimate or atomic
parts of entities. Given Loss’s atomic variety of CAI, every complex entity is indeed
identical to its atomic parts. As a result, the Goodmanian expectation that any dierence
between complex entities depends on their having dierent atomic parts nds a clear
motivation.
As Loss acknowledges, something is odd in the mereological picture emerging from
his paper; in his example the house is only the fusion of its atomic parts (and is one-many
identical to these atomic parts). The bricks exist (each brick is identical to its atomic
parts), and are parts of the house, but no plurality of bricks is such that the house is
their fusion. One might want an explanation of this; if one considers all the bricks of
which the house is made, one has in a sense covered the entire portion of reality of
the house. How does it happen that nonetheless, one has at this point no plurality of
bricks that compose the house? However, the feeling of oddness can perhaps be curbed
by the fact that, departing from the bricks, one can arrive at something that plays the
role of this plurality, albeit indirectly. In this way, it is also possible to account for the
intuitive sense in which the bricks are the same portion of reality of the house. Indeed,
consider the pluralities of atoms that are identical to each brick; and then unite all these
pluralities, each of which is identical to a brick; the plurality that one obtains from
this union is identical to the house. Thus, also in Loss’s paper, the bricks are the same
portion of reality of the house, albeit in this indirect way.
According to Botti in Composition as Analysis: the Meta-Ontological Origins (and
Future) of Composition as Identity, a major problem of the extant varieties of CAI is that
they rely on ii). In particular, they adopt a Quinean metaontology in conjunction with
CEM, and specically with Unrestricted Composition. As a result, CAI is adopted on
the background of a level ontological commitment to pluralities of entities and fusions:
the purpose of CAI in this context, as it is especially clear in Lewis (1991, §§3.4-3.6), is to
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ground the alleged ontological innocence of fusions in the context of CEM. According
to Botti, this approach paves the way for the discernibility-based objections we have
discussed above: if both the whole and the parts exist in the same way, then CAI is
committed to the hardly defensible claim that a single thing is identical to many things,
in spite of being numerically discernible from them.
In order to bring the debate forward, Botti proposes to lay aside CEM and the alleged
ontological innocence of fusions, and also to change the underlying metaontology, in
particular by admitting a form of expansionism inspired by Fine (2006) and Linnebo
(2018). The quantication domain is expandible, and its expansion also determines an
expansion of the domain of existents. To exist would not be tantamount to be real or
fundamental: the domain of existents is relative to the stage of the expansion, while
the reality or fundamentality of something depends on its absolute explanatory role.
The initial stage of the expansion includes only the entire world, which would be the
only fundamental entity: from there, the interpretationally possible expansions of the
domain come to include various choices of its parts. These parts are the same portion of
reality of the world, but provide additional metaphysical information about it. For this
reason, the inclusion of parts in the quantication domain would be a sort of analysis
of the world. Thus, a better name for CAI would be Composition as Analysis.
Indeed, it is not only a matter of worse and better names: at the end of the day, Botti
is willing to drop the claim that whole and parts are mutually identical, a claim which
entails – via the Indiscernibility of Identicals – that they are indiscernible. Precisely
because the expansions to parts bring new metaphysical information, the parts are
discernible from the whole: in fact, there are predicates which express this information,
and which are satised only by the parts, and not by the whole. Thus, Botti renounces
to the identity and to the indiscernibility of wholes with their parts, and this explains
the fact that her Composition as Analysis also avoids – as she convincingly argues –
Collapse.
Botti contrasts metaphysical information with merely semantic information. Two
referential expressions with dierent Fregean senses (such as “Hesperus” and “Phos-
phorus”) would carry dierent semantic information, but no dierent metaphysical
information. In contrast, the expansions of the quantication domain towards parts
would carry a more substantial kind of information, i.e. metaphysical information.
However, inasmuch as the parts are the same portion of reality than the whole, there
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are in both cases two dierent viewpoints on the same thing (where this thing is a star
in the Fregean case and a portion of reality in Botti’s case). These dierent viewpoints
presumably also account for the semantic dierences between the referential terms
for the parts and the referential terms for the whole: thus, it is not clear whether the
information which is added by the expansion is really non-semantic. More in general,
the concept of metaphysical information surely needs further investigation, and Botti’s
application of this concept is likely to stimulate it.
In his How to Identify Wholes and Their Parts Payton ends up dropping iii), by revising
the sense in which a whole is unitary. Through this revision, Payton sets forth a version
of CAI called Composition Entails Identity (CEI). In CEI, the sense in which a certain
whole is one is not numerical, but concerns the mutual cohesiveness of its parts. A
whole (identical to its parts) would be one in the sense that it is unitary, in contrast to
other pluralities of scattered parts, which lack this kind of unity. This substantial sense
of unity is typical of the hylomorphist – broadly Aristotelian – tradition. As a result,
Payton’s defense of CAI is a rare and interesting attempt to make sense of CAI out of
the context of CEM.
Payton also equates the oneness of wholes to the oneness of collective entities, such
as teams and ocks: thus, a team would be one in the sense of being cohesive and
interconnected, but would be many from the perspective of its cardinality. Payton
is open to the idea that collective entities, such as teams, are also instances of many-
one identity, so that the instances of composition would not be the only instances of
many-one identity.
A problem with Payton’s approach is that it does not clearly state how a whole should
be counted. Payton seems to think that a whole is one only in the sense that it is unitary,
and that, in contrast, a whole is not one in the more standard, cardinality-connected
sense that there is exactly an entity that is one of it. This means that, for what concerns
its cardinality, a typical whole is many and not one; but how many is it? Consider the
case of a chair, composed of four legs, a seat and a back: any of its parts is a whole,
composed for example by some molecules. Thus, according to Payton, presumably, the
seat of the chair is not one (in the cardinality-connected sense of oneness) either, but is
as many as the molecules composing it. Thus, there is the risk that, in order to count the
number of entities composing the chair, it is not enough to count the four legs, the seat
and the back: we should go down until we reach a mereological bottom layer of atoms
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(at least if there is such a bottom layer). Only this bottom layer would reveal the true
cardinality of the chair, which, far from being one in the cardinality-connected sense, it
will be as many as the mereological atoms in it. These highly revisionist consequences
about the cardinality of a chair (and of many other concrete objects) should be explicitly
discussed. In general, it seems that Payton, while focusing on a non-cardinality related
kind of oneness that any whole would enjoy, risks sidestepping (instead of solving) the
problem of the cardinality of a whole.
In contrast to Loss, Botti and Payton and as the title of his paper suggests, Bøhn in
Composition as Identity: Pushing Forward does not present a new variety of CAI, but
pushes forward the existing, radical version that he has already presented in some of
his previous works (Bøhn, 2009, 2014). According to Bøhn, composition abides by the
same logical principles that govern standard identity. He also thinks that composition
should be dened in terms of identity and that all the principles of CEM can be derived
from an adequately strong variety of CAI. In the face of the objections to CAI stemming
from the alleged indiscernibility of a whole from its parts, Bøhn advocates the idea
that the properties that seem to make a whole discernible from its parts (such as
cardinality, inasmuch as a whole is one and the parts are many) should be relativised to
concepts and that, given this relativisation, the Indiscernibility of Identicals also holds
for composition (this idea is also discussed in Lipman’s paper that we have analyzed in
§7). Bøhn suggests that the debate about CAI should move beyond these problems of
indiscernibility, which have already been adequately answered by the advocates of CAI.
Bøhn’s assessment of the debate about CAI and indiscernibility is arguably optimistic.
There are many open problems with the extension of indiscernibility to composition,
including the following three:
• it is far from clear which concepts are suitable for the role of property relativisers
(see Koslicki (1997) about this problem);
• the relativization of cardinality ascriptions to concepts makes it dicult (or
outright impossible) to paraphrase them in logical terms (Spencer, 2017, Carrara
and Lando, 2017);
• some of the most promising strategies to extend the Indiscernibility of Identicals
to composition risk relying on questionable presuppositions, such as atomism
(Cotnoir, 2013, fn. 13).
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Concerning the rst of the three above-cited problems (the identication of rela-
tivizing concepts), Bøhn’s paper indeed introduces a signicant novelty, claiming that
concepts should not be seen as mental entities or as components of propositions, but (in
a Fregean vein) as functions from objects to truth values. These functions are allowed to
exist in objective reality, and this legitimises their role in the defense of CAI. Consider
the portion of reality corresponding to a chair: it is one with respect to the concept
chair, and it is a very high number with respect to the concept molecule. For Bøhn both
these concepts are objectively existing denizens of reality, so that cardinality properties
can be attributed to the portion of reality only through the mediation of these functions.
It is not completely clear how these functions work: it seems that, when the concept
molecule is applied to the portion of reality, the output is not (or not only) the positive
truth value (inasmuch as that portion of reality consists of molecules), but also a certain
cardinality. How should the relation between these two outputs of the functions be
construed?
Bøhn’s version of CAI seems to rely on a rather peculiar kind of ontology, in which
concepts are no less important than objects. Presumably, concepts should not be
identied with properties, their purpose being that of relativizing properties. Thus,
entities fall under three basic categories: objects, properties and concepts. Portions of
reality also seem to play a role, and are perhaps the fourth basic category of entities.
Finally, Woods’ Many, but One contributes to the cause of CAI by suggesting that
CAI can be helpful in solving the so-called Problem of the Many (Unger, 1980). In the
instances of this problem, a myriad of entities seems to exist, where common sense
would instead suggest that there is only one entity. In a variation of the standard
example (which involves a cat on a mat), there are many dierent mereological fusions
in the spatio-temporal region where we expect our umbrella to be: these mereological
fusions include or exclude molecules of rain water or portions of tissue at the periphery
of the umbrella. It seems arbitrary to pinpoint only one of those fusions as the only,
true umbrella; but it also seems wrong to claim that a myriad umbrellas exist there.
Woods’s solution consists of claiming that the many candidates for the role of the
umbrella are collectively many-one identical to a single entity, and that this single entity
is the best candidate to the role of the umbrella. Woods remarks that his approach is
similar to a pre-extant solution to the problem of the many, namely Sider’s maximality
approach (Sider, 2001). According to Sider, the best candidate for the role of the umbrella
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is the most inclusive among the candidates, i.e. the fusion that occupies the wider
spatio-temporal region. This most inclusive candidate will also be the fusion of all the
candidates, so that Woods and Sider agree in their identication of the best candidate.
Nonetheless, Woods suggests that his own solution is superior to Sider’s because it
explains why the chosen candidate is the best. In Sider’s maximality approach it is
not clear why – so to say – bigger is better. In contrast, the fact of being such that all
the candidates are collectively identical to it (this is the characterising feature of the
best candidate in Woods’s approach) would be a clear criterion for identifying the best
candidate.
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